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POPULATION AGEING AND LABOUR SUPPLY PROSPECTS IN CHINA FROM 2005 TO 2050 
 
1   INTRODUCTION  
Increased life expectancy and rapid fertility decline since the 1970s have combined to create a 
very rapid rate of population ageing in China. These demographic developments are expected to 
result in an ageing workforce and a significant slow-down in the growth of the working age 
population. According to the UN medium variant of population projection, the size of the working 
age population will increase only slightly over the next 10 years and begin to shrink soon after 
2020. Furthermore, since the participation rate of the elderly population is much lower than that of 
the prime-age labour force, ageing of the workforce will reduce the aggregate labour force 
participation rate (ALFPR). Stagnant growth of the working age population combined with the 
declining aggregate LFPR will put downward pressure on labour supply.  
 
 It is improbable that the demand for labour will fall to match prospective contractions of labour 
supply (McDonald and Kippen 2001). In fact, there are sound reasons for believing that labour 
demand will rise for years to come (Tsay 2003). Hence, the reduction of available labour has 
potentially important adverse implications for economic growth (Peng 2005).  Government officials 
and scholars are, consequently, eager to identify suitable strategies to cope with the ageing 
problem. A common suggestion from scholars is that liberalization of the strict population control 
policy may help to decelerate the rate of population ageing, slow down the decrease in the labour 
force and mitigate the adverse prognoses for macroeconomic growth. However, any such 
liberalization will counteract the original object of China’s family planning policy by increasing 
population growth. The potential conflict between achieving a desirable demographic structure and 
a desirable population size poses a dilemma for policy makers.  
 
The present paper examines the future trend of labour supply in China over the period 2005 to 
2050 under alternative fertility regimes. It investigates the impact of different age structures 
(demographic composition effects) on future labour supply and the implications of changes in the 
current level of the labour force participation rate.  
 
Our analytical approach is similar to McDonald and Kippen (2001). However, unlike McDonald and 
Kippen, we do not consider international migration but we do include the impact on labour supply 
of changes in the age structure.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: the next section places the present investigation in the context 
of the ageing – growth nexus by briefly summarising major findings about the adverse implications  3
of ageing for macroeconomic performance. Section three discusses the evolution of the working 
age population over the period 2005 to 2050 under alternative fertility scenarios. Section four 
explores the effects of population ageing on the labour force participation rate and, therefore, on 
labour supply. Possible changes in the age- and sex-specific labour force participation rates are 
investigated in section five, and the final section presents conclusions and policy implications.  
 
2   AGEING AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN CHINA – EVIDENCE FROM CGE MODELLING 
The impact of population ageing on economic growth is a matter of deep concern to scholars and 
policymakers alike. A prominent link in the ageing – growth nexus is the behaviour of labour 
supply. This link was examined in an earlier study with the help of a computable general 
equilibrium model (PRCGEM) to simulate the macroeconomic consequences of population ageing 
in China during the 21
st century (Peng 2005). The qualitative result of that investigation highlights 
the increasingly adverse growth consequences of a labour supply reduction regime. 
 
More specifically, given the baseline scenario with constant fertility (at 1.62) and average labour 
force participation (at the 2000 level of 82.35 per cent) rates contraction of the labour supply 
reduces the growth rate of per capita real GDP by 2, 2.6 and 3.0 percentage points annually during 
the 2020s, 2030s and 2040s, respectively, compared with the growth rate of the first decade of the 
century. If China’s total fertility rate (TFR) were to increase to 1.8 or to the replacement level of 2.1 
at the beginning of the century, then labour supply would expand. Provided the rate of productivity 
improvement is maintained, this expansion would help mitigate the adverse effects of population 
ageing on macroeconomic growth.
1 If, on the other hand, the TFR continues to decline to very low 
levels (such as 1.35), then economic growth will fall even further. Initially, the reduction in the size 
of the total population serves to raise the growth of per capita real income slightly above the 
baseline scenario (during the first twenty years). However, from the 2030s onwards even per 
capita real income drops below the baseline level because the low TFR accelerates the rate of 
decrease of labour supply which, in turn, slows down the process of capital formation.  
 
Constancy of the ALFPR (at the 2000 level of 82.35 per cent) during the simulation period is a very 
restrictive assumption. It is highly implausible that China’s ALFPR will remain at such a high level 
throughout the 21
st century. In the first instance, ageing of the workforce will cause the ALFPR to 
fall because the participation rate of the elderly population is much lower than that of the prime-age 
labour force. Secondly, expansion of educational opportunities will remove large, and possibly 
increasingly large, numbers of young people from the labour force and substantially reduce their 
labour force participation rate. Thirdly, the development of a pension system in China, especially in 
the rural areas, will weaken work incentives for the older age groups and, hence, may reduce the 
participation rate of the elderly population. Fourthly, as affluence increases private spending will be  4
devoted increasingly to luxury goods, including the consumption of leisure. The disposition to enjoy 
a more casual lifestyle invariably reduces the ALFPR by restricting the total number of hours 
available for work.
2   
 
The exceedingly likely reduction in the labour force participation rate, combined with negative 
growth of the working age population that is driven by low fertility, will put significant downward 
pressure on labour supply in China. Given the adverse implications for the macro economy of 
reductions in labour supply, it is important to understand the demographic forces that shape its 
temporal evolution. These involve prominently the LFPR and its interaction with the ageing profile 
of the population. This paper will focus on trend changes in China’s labour supply over the period 
2005 to 2050 under the assumption of alternative fertility regimes. We will explore the effects of 
demographic shifts on the ALFPR as well as on compositional changes of the labour force that are 
captured by the age-and sex-labour force participation rates.  
 
3   ALTERNATIVE POPULATION SCENARIOS AND EVOLUTION OF WORKING AGE 
POPULATION 
The rapid population ageing and potential labour supply contraction beyond 2020 are primarily the 
result of the dramatic decline in fertility rates during the 1970s and 80s and the low level of fertility 
in the 1990s. Family planning policy has played an important role in the rapid demographic shift 
(Hernandez, 1984; Kaufman, Zhang and Zhang, 1989, Wang, Keng and Smyth, 2002).
 3 Since its 
introduction at the beginning of the 1970s there have been 300 million fewer births than would 
have occurred if the pre-existing birth rate had been maintained (Wu, 1997).  
 
The significant success of the family planning policy in reducing population growth suggests that 
the institutional and cultural environment in China is conducive to the pursuit of active population 
policies. In particular, the Chinese government may be able to adjust the fertility rate by relaxing 
the current one-child per couple restriction. The main issue for scholars and policy makers are the 
question whether to adjust the current population policy, or how to adjust it. 
  
3.1   The choice of population policy  
So far there are mainly two views of the future direction of population policy in China:  
 
Negative population growth strategy.  
It has been argued that the large size of China’s population has hampered her economic growth 
and development (Zhai, 2000, 2001; Wu, et al. 2004 and Li, X. P. 2002). Therefore, controlling 
Formatted: Bullets and
Numbering 5
population growth should remain the main objective of population policy. Secondly, the further 
increase in the population size that would result from easing the one-child policy will put additional 
pressure on the labour market and on the ecological environment, and restrain rapid economic 
growth. These considerations suggest that the fertility rate should be maintained below the 
replacement level in the long run. Government should implement a negative population growth 
strategy in the medium to long run.  
 
Advocates of a negative population growth strategy debate how far fertility should be reduced. 
There are two main views: 
◊  Retention of the one-child policy. The notable success in reducing the fertility rate has 
been accompanied by significant dispersion in fertility rates between rural and urban areas, 
and East and West China.  This imbalance implies that any relaxation of the one-child 
policy will cause a new baby boom that is driven by the high fertility rates in many poor and 
backward areas.  
◊  Partial relaxation of the one-child policy. The second view maintains that the total fertility 
rate should be stabilized in the long run at the average level of the late 1990s, around 1.8. 
In order to achieve this target, the government should partially adjust the restrictive one 
child policy regime at the beginning of the 21st century.  
 
Zero population growth strategy.  
Other scholars are concerned about the consequences of low fertility and its potentially serious 
adverse effects on the economy. They vigorously advocate that China should maintain a stable 
population size in the long run. That is, policy should aim to raise the TFR to the replacement level 
of 2.1 or 2.0 and to maintain it there. This would require adopting a universal two child per couple 
policy at the beginning of the 21st century (Li, J.X. 2002) 
 
3.2   Fertility scenarios and the proportion of the elderly population 
Given the population policy choices that are under prominent discussion in China, we choose four 
fertility scenarios to capture roughly the major demographic effects of alternative population policy 
strategies - on the fertility rate, working age population and age structure. Our projection horizon 
extends to the middle of the 21
st century. 
 
•  Baseline scenario – constant fertility: We choose the constant fertility variant prepared by 




•  Scenario 2 – low fertility variant: In this scenario, TFR decreases from 1.7 (2000 to 2005) to 
1.49 (2005 to 2010), 1.41 (2010 to 2015) and further to 1.35 (2015 to 2020) where it remains 
until 2050. This fertility scenario is approximately consistent with the one-child policy regime.  
•  Scenario 3 – medium fertility variant: In this scenario, TFR increases from 1.7 (2000 to 
2005) to 1.74 (2005 to 2010), 1.81 (2010 to 2015), and further to 1.84 (2015 to 2020) where it 
remains until 2050. This scenario may capture the compromise solution of a partial adjustment 
to the current one-child policy mentioned above. 
•  Scenario 4 – High fertility variant: TFR in this scenario increases from 1.7 (2000-2005) to 
1.9 (2005-2010), 1.95 (2010-2015), 2.0 (2015-2020), 2.05 (2020-2025), and further to 2.08 
(2025 to 2030) where it remains until 2050. This high fertility scenario captures salient 
elements of the two-child policy option.  
 
The population projections corresponding to the first three fertility scenarios were prepared by the 
UN Population Division in 2004. The last population projection is prepared by Qiao and Chen 
(2003). Tables 1, 2 and 3 report the profiles for the first half of the 21
st century of total population 
sizes, proportions of the elderly population and working age population under the four fertility 
scenarios. 
 
Total population size 
The total population size differs significantly between the four scenarios, especially from 2020 
onward. Under constant fertility (TFR = 1.7), total population peaks at around 1,420 million in 2025, 
declining subsequently to reach 1,326 million in 2050. In the low fertility scenario where the TFR 
continues to decline to 1.35 after 2015, total population peaks earlier (in 2020) at around 1368 
million and declines rapidly to 1,171 million in 2050. In contrast, in the high fertility variant (TFR 
increasing to 2.08), population reaches a peak of 1,502 million only in 2045. The total population 
falls to 1,498 million in 2050. The difference in population size between the low variant and high 
variant projections amounts to 327 million in the middle of the century. In scenario 3 (medium 
variant), population peaks at 1446 million in 2030. By 2050, the total population will be 1392 
million. The gap of total population at the middle of this century between scenario 3 and scenario 2 
is 221 million. 
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2000 1,274  1,274  1,274  1,274 
2010 1,353  1,342  1,355  1,358 
2020 1,409  1,368  1,424  1,436 
2025 1,420  1,364  1,441  1,467 
2030 1,419  1,347  1,446  1,488 
2040 1,389  1,278  1,432  1,501 
2045 1,362  1,228  1,417  1,502 
2050 1,326  1,171  1,392  1,498 
Source: UN (2004) and Qiao and Chen (2003) 
 
The proportion of the elderly population and population ageing 
The extent and speed of ageing depend inter alia on the fertility level (Table 2). None of the four 
population scenarios allows for changes in the absolute size of the elderly population. The reason 
is that the time horizon for our projections is limited to 50 years but the elderly population is defined 
as the group aged 65 and above. Hence, none of the alternative fertility assumptions can feed into 
the determination of the size of the elderly population within the time frame of our projections. From 
the perspective of economic growth, however, important considerations relate also to the 
proportionate size of the elderly population, not only to its absolute size. 
 
Table 2: Trends of the proportion of elderly in China (per cent) 










2000  6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 
2010  8.3 8.4 8.3 8.2 
2020  12.0 12.4 11.9 10.7 
2030  16.6 17.5 16.3 14.1 
2040  23.0 25.0 22.3 18.2 
2050  24.8 28.1 23.6 18.4 
Source:  UN (2004) and Qiao and Chen (2003) 
 
The proportion of the elderly in the total population increases most rapidly in the low fertility 
scenario (scenario 2). It reaches 12.4, 17.5 and 28.1 per cent, respectively, in years 2020, 2030 
and 2050. In the baseline scenario (constant fertility) and in scenario 3 (medium variant), the 
proportions of the elderly rise to 24.8 and 23.6 per cent by 2050, while in the high fertility regime 
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the proportion of the elderly reaches only 18.4 per cent. By 2050 the difference between the low 
and high fertility scenarios (2 and 4) of the share of the elderly in the total population amounts to a 
remarkable 35 per cent. The differences in the proportion of the elderly population under the four 
fertility regimes illustrate the significant impact that fertility choice can exert on future population 
structure. 
 
3.3   Working age population 
The four scenarios show the same growth rate of the working age population during the first two 
decades because the change in the fertility level can affect the size of the working age population 
only after some 15 to 20 years (Table 3) and the working age population increases to reach a peak 
of 1,001 million around 2015. In the low fertility scenario, the working age population decreases at 
the fastest rate, falling to 720 million by 2050. Accordingly, continued decline in China’s fertility rate 
to very low levels will lead to a rapidly shrinking labour force, reducing the working age population 
by some 17 percent over thirty years (2020-2050). However, if the Chinese government can 
manage to increase the TFR to the replacement level, for example by implementing a universal 
two-child policy (scenario 4), then the working population will declines slightly to 940 million in 
2050. This represents a working age population that is 69 million larger than in 2000. It implies that 
by maintaining the replacement level fertility, China can prevent its working age population from 
declining during the first half of this century. 
 
Table 3: Trends of working age population in China  











2000 871  871  871  871 
2010 978  978  978  978 
2015 1,001  1,001  1,001  1,001 
2020 992  992  992  992 
2030 959  934  966  987 
2040 870  814  891  947 
2050 810  720  845  940 
Source:  UN (2004) and Qiao and Chen (2003). 
 
The difference in the total size of the working age population between the four fertility scenarios 
becomes significant by the middle of the century. For example, in scenario 2 it will be 23 percent 
less than in scenario 4 (high fertility), and 15 per cent less than in scenario 3 (medium fertility). The 
large differentials in the size of the working age population demonstrate the potentially substantial 
impact of population policy on China’s future labour supply.  9
 
4   THE DEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSITION EFFECT AND LABOUR SUPPLY  
Labour supply is determined jointly by the size and the LFPR of the various age and sex categories 
of the working age population (McDonald and Kippen 2001). Since changing age structures affect 
the age-specific LFPRs, they change the aggregate LFPR (ALFPR) which is a weighted average of 
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where  t PR  is the ALFPR in year t,  t i PR , is the participation rate of cohort i in year t, and  t i s . is the 
share of working population cohort iin  t WP , the total working age population aged 15 to 64 in year 
t. We identify ten 5-year sex-specific cohorts (i =1, 2,…10) in the analysis. Equation (1) shows that 
changes in the ALFPR reflect either changes in cohort (age-specific) participation rates or changes 
in the composition of the working age population - the demographic composition effect. Many 
social, economic and cultural factors influence the cohort participation rates. In this section we will 
ignore such changes, leaving the discussion to the next section, and only calculate the 
demographic composition effect. 
 
Data from China’s fifth population census in 2000 show that the ALFPR was 82.35 per cent. 
Detailed cohort and sex specific participation rates in 2000 are shown in Table 4. We estimate the 
trend of the ALFPR over the half century by assuming that the cohort participation rates remain at 
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where  t PR  is the aggregate participation rate that would have been observed at time t if all cohort 
participation rates remained at their 2000 levels. Changes in  t PR , therefore, reflect changes in the 
composition of the labour force. Table 4 presents estimates of ALFPR for the baseline scenario 
(constant fertility). The evolution of the demographic age structure reduces the ALFPR from 82.35 
percent in 2000 to approximately 78.79 per cent in 2050 if the TFR remains at 1.7. The 
demographic composition effect is 3.6 percentage points. As a result, the labour force in the 
baseline scenario will contract to 638 million (Table 6. That represents an 11 percent decline from 
its level in 2000. 
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Table 4: Detailed demographic composition effect on Aggregate labour force participation 
rate in China from 2000 to 2050 








































Men          
 15-19  49.1  5.94 2.92 5.49 2.70 4.44 2.18 
20-24  90.23  5.07 4.58 6.25 5.64 4.98 4.50 
25-29  97.90  6.52 6.39 5.26 5.15 5.32 5.21 
30-34  98.07  7.32 7.18 5.07 4.97 6.02 5.90 
35-39  97.89  6.45 6.32 6.21 6.08 5.05 4.94 
40-44  97.44  4.96 4.83 6.44 6.28 4.86 4.73 
45-49  96.41  5.24 5.05 5.32 5.13 5.93 5.72 
50-54  90.90  3.92 3.57 4.27 3.88 6.10 5.55 
55-59  80.30  2.89 2.32 4.20 3.38 4.94 3.96 
60-64  60.35  2.61 1.57 2.94 1.78 3.79 2.29 
Men 
total 
87.80  50.93 44.72 51.46 44.98 51.44 44.99 
Women          
15-19  51.74  5.56 2.88 4.93 2.55 3.99 2.07 
20-24  85.39  5.07 4.33 5.67 4.84 4.49 3.84 
25-29  86.66  6.46 5.60 4.89 4.24 4.81 4.17 
30-34  87.97  7.18 6.32 4.79 4.22 5.51 4.85 
35-39  88.38  6.28 5.55 5.95 5.26 4.75 4.20 
40-44  86.25  4.69 4.04 6.25 5.39 4.65 4.01 
45-49  79.97  5.03 4.03 5.12 4.10 5.77 4.61 
50-54  67.15  3.69 2.48 4.00 2.69 6.01 4.04 
55-59  54.57  2.70 1.47 4.08 2.23 4.87 2.66 
60-64  38.94  2.41 0.94 2.85 1.11 3.71 1.45 
Women 
total 
76.68  49.07 37.63 48.54 36.61 48.56 35.87 
ALFPR**  82.35  100  82.35  100  81.59  100  80.86 
*PR is participation rate. 
** ALFPR is aggregate labour force participation rate 
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Table 4 (continued): Detailed demographic composition effect on aggregate labour force 
participation rate in China from 2000 to 2050 



































Men          
15-19  4.59  2.25  4.47 2.20 4.26 2.09 
20-24  4.49  4.05  4.83 4.36 4.41 3.98 
25-29  4.53  4.43  4.99 4.88 4.74 4.64 
30-34  5.04  4.95  4.86 4.77 5.11 5.01 
35-39  5.36  5.24  4.88 4.78 5.27 5.16 
40-44  6.04  5.89  5.42 5.28 5.12 4.99 
45-49  5.05  4.87  5.74 5.54 5.13 4.94 
50-54  4.83  4.39  6.44 5.85 5.66 5.15 
55-59  5.79  4.65  5.30 4.25 5.91 4.74 
60-64  5.75  3.47  4.89 2.95 6.43 3.88 
Men 
total 
51.47 44.20 51.82  44.86  52.04  44.58 
Women          
15-19  4.14  2.14  4.05 2.09 3.86 2.00 
20-24  4.05  3.46  4.37 3.73 4.00 3.41 
25-29  4.09  3.54  4.52 3.92 4.31 3.73 
30-34  4.58  4.03  4.41 3.88 4.64 4.09 
35-39  4.89  4.32  4.44 3.92 4.80 4.24 
40-44  5.60  4.83  4.97 4.29 4.67 4.03 
45-49  4.82  3.85  5.30 4.24 4.70 3.76 
50-54  4.70  3.16  6.05 4.06 5.24 3.52 
55-59  5.76  3.15  5.15 2.81 5.54 3.02 
60-64  5.89  2.29  4.93 1.92 6.22 2.42 
Women 
total 
48.53 34.78 48.18  34.86  47.96  34.21 
ALFPR  100  78.97  100  79.71  100  78.79 
Source: Data in column one is calculated from China’s fifth population census in 2000 and data for the 
source population weights for different years is based on United Nations population projection (constant 
fertility variant) (2004).          
 
Using the same methodology, we estimated the demographic composition effects under the other 
three fertility scenarios and calculated the corresponding ALFPR. The results are displayed in 
Table 5.  
 
  12
Table 5: Demographic composition effects (percentage points) and trends of aggregate 







        Scenario four 
(High fertility) 
















2000 -- 82.35 --  82.35  --  82.35  --  82.35 
2010 -0.76 81.59 -0.76  81.59  -0.76  81.59 -0.76      81.59 
2020 -1.49 80.86 -1.49  80.86  -1.49  80.86 -1.49  80.86 
2030  -3.38  78.97  -3.03   79.32  -3.52  78.83   -3.15  79.20 
2040 -2.64 79.71 -2.66  79.69  -2.63  79.72    -2.59  79.76 
2050 -3.56 78.79 -4.19  78.16  -3.39  78.96    -3.16  79.19 
 
Again, the alternative fertility scenarios cannot display any differences in the demographic 
composition effect during the initial 20 years. The differences that do emerge during the 2030s and 
2040s are not significant in view of slight differences in the age structure. However, the difference 
becomes significant with the increasing divergence in the age structure. In 2050, the demographic 
composition effect is 1.03 percentage points larger in scenario two (low fertility) than in scenario 
four (high fertility). The most rapid population ageing in scenario two reduces the ALFPR to 78.16 
per cent. As a result, the total labour force declines to 563 million, 21.5 per cent below its 2000 
level (Table 6). However, in scenario four characterized by the high replacement fertility rate and 
relatively slower population ageing, the demographic composition effect is smaller (3.16 
percentage points), generating a relatively higher ALFPR (79.19 per cent). As a result, the total 
size of the labour force will be 754 million in 2050, 5 per cent larger than in 2000. 
 










2000 717    717  717  717 
2005 763    763  763  763 
2010 798    798  798  798 
2020  803   803  803               803 
2030 757    741  762  793 
2040 693    648  710  765 
2050 638    563  667  754 
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Changes in the demographic composition of the working population under alternative fertility 
scenarios feed into the total size of labour force. By 2050, the labour force will be 25 per cent lower 
in the low fertility scenario 2 than in scenario 4. Without the demographic composition effects, that 
difference would be 23 per cent. 
 
5   AGE- AND SEX-SPECIFIC PARTICIPATION RATES AND LABOUR SUPPLY 
Our investigation of the impact of the age structure on labour supply assumed that age and sex-
specific participation rates remain at their 2000 levels. This section examines potential changes in 
the age- and sex-specific participation rates over that period. 
 
During the 1980s China experienced an increase in the ALFPR, from 82 per cent in 1982 to 85 per 
cent in 1990, that was spread across most working age groups. The only exceptions were the 
relatively young age groups 15 to 19 and 20 to 24, for whom participation rates dropped (Figure 1). 
Even though the ALFPR declined slightly during the 1990s, it remained at historically high levels. In 
1995, it dropped slightly to 84.97 per cent, declining further to 82.35 per cent in 2000. All age 
groups contributed to this reduction in the ALFPR, but particularly the relatively young age groups 
whose participation rates displayed a sustained and fast drop.     
 
Figure 1: Labour force participation rates in China from 1980-2000 
 
Comparison of LFPRs by gender indicates that the evolution of the LFPR for women is the main 
driver for the changes in the ALFPR over the period 1980 to 2000 (Figure 2). The LFPR for males 
remains roughly stable (except for the young age group) while for females the LFPR increases in 
all age groups during the 1980s, except for the age groups 15-19 and 20-24, and then declines 






15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64
age group
%
1980 1990 2000 1995 14
 








15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64
age group
%
Male 1980 Male 1990 Male 2000
Female 1980 Female 1990 Female 2000
 
The historical evolution of age- and sex-specific LFPRs displayed in Figure 2 also shows that 
•  women’s LFPR are lower than men’s in all cohorts (except for cohort 15-19);  
•  the divergence increases significantly beyond age 45. Women’s workforce participation 
declines substantially at age 45, while men maintain a high participation rate until they 
reach age 60. The difference in compulsory retirement age between men and women (55 
and 50 years, respectively) is one reason; 
•  women enjoy lower education opportunities than men because the 15-19 cohort is the only 
age group for which women show a higher LFPR than men. 
 
Many social, economic and cultural factors affect the age- and sex-specific participation rates. This 
section explores the nature of changes in those rates during the first half of this century in China.  
 
5.1   Labour force participation of the young population 
Table 7 compares the participation rates in 2000 of the age groups 15-19 and 20-24 in China with 
selected countries.   15
Table 7: Labour force participation rate at ages 15-19 and 20-24, by sex in 2000 (per cent) 
Ages 15-19  Ages 20-24 
Country and district 
Males  Females  Males  Females 
China 54.1  61.4  90.7  86.6 
        
Thailand 38  30.9  77.2  66.4 
Malaysia 32.3  22  85.4  61.5 
Philippines 41.7  24.9  78.2 52 
South Korea  11.5  12.4  52.4  60.9 
Singapore 18  20.1  75.9  78.7 
Taiwan*  20.4  18.5  64.8  61.6 
Hong Kong  18.1  15.9  75.9  74.7 
Japan  18  16  74  74 
        
New Zealand  53.7  53.1  79.2  67.1 
Australia 54.2  58.4  85  77.5 
Canada 51.8  51.8  79.9  73.9 
United States  50.2  51.2  81.6  73.1 
Sweden 32  37.8  70  61.6 
Germany 36 29  78  71 
Italy 21.9  14.9  63.6  50.2 
Greece 15.9  13.4  71  68.1 
Source: For Taiwan, Tsay Ching-Lung (2003); for other countries, ILO (2006) 
 * 2001 data for Taiwan. 
 
•  15-19 age group 
The LFPR for this age group (54.1 and 61.4 for males and females, respectively) is very high in 
China compared with other selected Asian and western countries and regions. For example, in 
South Korea the comparable rates were only 11.5 per cent and 12.4 per cent, respectively. The 
high participation rate in China reflects the very low rates of participation in education at these 
ages.
4 As educational opportunities expand, particularly for women, the LFPR of this group would 
be expected to decline. Indeed, historical data shows that the LFPR of this age group has already 
declined in China (Figure 3). In 2005, these figures were 49.3 and 56.4, respectively. Within 25 
years, LFPR of this group has fallen by 34 per cent for males and by 32 per cent for females.  
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15-19 male 15-19 female
20-24 male 20-24 female
Source: ILO (2006)
 
The experience of selected Asian countries and regions shown in Table 8 confirms our conjecture 
that labour force participation by this young age group has declined dramatically over the past 35 
years throughout the Asian region. In Hong Kong it has declined by 68 per cent for males and by 
74 per cent for females. Singapore has experienced a similarly dramatic decline. The fall is even 
more impressive in South Korea, amounting to 80 per cent for males and 74 per cent for females. 
In Thailand, the dramatic decline in LFPR occurred after 1990. Within 15 years (from 1990 to 
2005), the LFPR for males fell by 51 per cent and by 71 per cent for females.  
 
This historical evidence about the demographic composition of the labour force informs all the 
labour supply projections that were conducted for the present study. We assume that the LFPR of 
the 15-19 year age group follows its historical trend up to 2005 and declines thereafter at 1.6 per 
cent annually. This assumption generates LFPRs by 2050 of 23.9 and 29.1 per cent for males and 
females, respectively, for this age cohort (Table A1 provides detailed information). At that time 
China’s assumed LFPRs are comparable to the levels that had been attained at the beginning of 
the 1990s in Hong Kong and Singapore, and in Japan already in the late 1970s. Given the very low 
participation rates observed for this age group in the East and South East Asian countries and 
regions (Table 8), this assumption may be an excessively optimistic conjecture.  
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Table 8:  Labour force participation ate at ages 15-19 by sex (per cent) 
Hong Kong  Singapore  South Korea  Thailand  Japan 
Year 
Male  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female 
1960  --- --- ---  --- --- --- --- ---  51.6  49.7 
1970  ---  ---  55.7  43.0 45.9 40.3 77.4 77.2 36.6 35.9 
1971  50.4  56.4  ---  --- --  --- --- --- --- --- 
1975 ---  ---  --  --  46.0  47.5  ---  ---  ---  --- 
1976  51.4  55.3  44.1  42.2  --- --- --- --- --- --- 
1980  41.8 40.7 45.8  48.1 27.3 34.4 70.9 71.0 20.3 18.8 
1985  35.2 31.5 32.6  33.7 14.5 21.1 69.6 70.7  --  -- 
1990  29.6 25.8 26.9  28.3 10.8 18.7 67.7 69.4 19.9 17.4 
1995  22.6 18.8 20.5  19.1  9.5  14.5 47.5 44.0 18.8 15.8 
2000  18.1 15.9 18.0  20.1 11.5 12.4 38.0 30.9 17.4 15.4 
2005  15.9 14.9 14.8  15.4  8.8  10.6 33.5 19.8  --  -- 
Source: Data for Japan is from National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Japan (2006). 
All other data are from ILO (2006) 
 
 
•  20-24 age group 
The LFPR for the group 20-24 has also declined in China, but the drop is much smaller than for the 
age group 15-19. Over the quarter century 1980 to 2005 the rate declined by 7.2 per cent for men 
and by 11 per cent for women (Figure 3). In 2005, the LFPR for men was 89.8 per cent and for 
women it was 85.9 per cent.  
 
Table 9: Labour force participation rate at ages 20-24 by sex (per cent) 
Hong Kong  Singapore  South 
Korea 
Thailand  Japan 
Year 








1980  89.8  80.2  92.5  79  76.5 53.5 87.8 80.3 74.7 71.1 
1985  88.2  83.4  88.8 78.9 63.3 55.1 90.4 81.2  --  -- 
1990  85.8  83.2  84.0 80.9 60.2 64.6 91.6 81.7 75.4 75.5 
1995  79.2  77.2  76.2 77.2 58.8 66.1 85.7 71.7 75.8 74.2 
2000  75.9  74.7  75.9 78.7 52.4 60.9 77.2 66.4 70.2 70.5 
2005  70.8  71.8  72.8 77.9 59.1 66.0 77.5 64.4  --  -- 
Source: Data for Japan is from National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Japan  (2006). 
All other data are from ILO (2006) 
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Compared with the countries shown in Table 7, the LFPR in 2000 of this age group is much higher 
in China than in the selected Asian and western countries and regions. The experience of the 
selected Asian countries and regions in Table 9 implies that with the continued economic 
development in China, the LFPR for this age group will also keep declining. Meanwhile, “as 
technology advances, and as those with high skills continue to receive high rewards from the 
labour market, it is likely that young adults will spend more time in acquiring higher levels of formal 
education” (McDonald and Kippen, page 7, 2001). In all the scenarios of the present paper we 
assume that the LFPR for this age group maintains its historical trend and continues to decline at 
0.3 per cent annually for men and at 0.25 per cent for women until 2050 (changes in participation 
rates are reported in Table A1).  
 
5.2 Labour force participation of the old population, 50 to 64 age group 
The distinguishing feature of Figure 4 is that the female LFPR for each of the older age cohorts of 
the population is distinctly and persistently lower than for the corresponding males.  
 
Figure 4: The LFPR for population aged 50-64 by sex in China 

















































































































50-54 male 55-59 male 60-64 male
50-54 female 55-59 female 60-64 female
Source: ILO(2006)
 
•  Males’ participation rates 
The changes in the participation rate for males aged 50-54 are positive but very modest, increasing 
from 91.5 in 1980 to 92.7 per cent in 2005. For the age group 55-59, the rate dropped slightly from 
83.2 in 1980 to 80.9 per cent in 2005. However, the participation rate for males aged 60-64 has 
steadily increased from 62.9 in 1980 to 68.7 per cent in 2005 (Figure 4). 
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Compared with developed countries the Chinese rates are typically high, except for Japan (Table 
10). But they are lower than in the selected Asian countries, which have similar or higher income 
levels.  
 
Table 10: Labour force participation rate at ages 50-64, by sex in 2000 (per cent) 
Ages 50-54  Ages 55-59  Ages 60-64 
Country and district 
Males  Females  Males  Females  Males  Females 
China  92.7  58.9  80.9 41.5 68.7  26.9 
            
Thailand 94.8  74.4  90.5  63.6  80.9  39.2 
Malaysia 93.4  40.6  75.1  28.5  61.6  23.2 
Philippines 95.6  68.0  89.3  55.7  79.1  50.3 
South  Korea 89.1  55.2  77.7 51.1 63.4  45.9 
Singapore  91.3  46.7  74.4 29.6 49.6  15.3 
Taiwan*  ---  ---    70.9 ---   52.0  --- 
Japan  95.0  66.2  92.6 57.1 71.6  37.6 
            
Australia 84.8  66.6  73  47.6  46.8  22.3 
Canada  86.5  71.0  72.9 53.4 46.1  27.2 
United  States  86.8  74.1  77.1 61.4 55.0  40.2 
Sweden  90.6  86.2  84.6 79.6 56.8  48.5 
Germany  90.3  71.9  76.1 55.7 30.2  13.3 
Italy  82.6  41.6  53.9 24.3 31.4 8.0 
Greece  87.9  42.6  72.1 31.4 45.2  20.5 
Source: ILO (2006) and Tsay Ching-Lung (2003) for the data of Taiwan. 
* 2001 data for Taiwan. 
 
 
•  Female’s participation rate  
The participation rates of females aged 50-64 are much lower than those of males in China. In 
addition to the difference in retirement age for men and women the low education level of women 
in this age group constitutes another important reason for that disparity. The temporal evolution of 
the participations rates during the last 25 years of the three “old population” age groups shows the 
same tendencies: a slight increase during 1980s followed by modest declines during the 1990s 
(Figure 4).  
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The participation rates of females aged 50-59 are lower in China than in most of the countries and 
regions shown in Table 10. In Asia, only Singapore and Malaysia and in Western countries, only 
Italy and Greece have lower participation rates than China in 2000. For the age group 60-64, the 
participation rate shows a large divergence between the countries. The participation rate of women 
aged 60-64 is much lower in China than in Japan, South Korea, Thailand and Philippines. 
 
Looking ahead, there is a great deal of uncertainty surrounding the evolution of the participation 
rate of these age groups for both males and females. This study assumes three hypothetical 
evolutionary trends over the next 45 years:  
 
•  First, slight decline then stability: Given the existing retirement ages, sustained economic 
growth, a rising living standard and gradual improvements of the pension system, the LFPR of 
the older population (50-59) is likely to decline slightly initially, and then to stabilize at that lower 
level. For the period 2005-2015, this study adopts the ILO projection. This is a conventional 
assumption and we define it, therefore, as the “conventional case” (CC). 
 
•  Second, moderate increase: The OECD (1998) suggests that, in an ageing society, attention 
should be focused on increasing the LFPR of men at older ages. This may be brought about by 
an increase in the retirement age. Furthermore, increasing educational engagement of women 
will stimulate their economic activities and labour force participation, especially after age 40. The 
expansion of educational opportunities is likely to affect all cohort participation rates albeit in 
different ways. Increasing school enrolments, especially at upper secondary and tertiary level, 
will reduce the participation rate, especially among the young (15-24) while increasing it later in 
life, especially after age 40. The evidence from Australia and Canada shows that there exists a 
positive relationship between education level and labour force participation rate, especially for 
women (Day and Dowrick, 2004; Dugan and Robidoux, 1999). Accordingly, for this scenario we 
assume that by 2050 the labour force participation rates for these three age groups will increase 
to the level of Japan in 2000. For men, the annual rates of increase will be 0.06, 0.3 and 0.04 per 
cent for age groups 50-54, 55-59 and 60-64, respectively. For women, the corresponding figures 
are 0.28, 0.76 and 0.52 per cent. We define this scenario as the “optimistic case” (OC).  
 
•  Third, substantial increase: Sweden has the highest female LFPR at ages 50 and above in 
the developed countries. We follow McDonald and Kippen (2001) to assume that in the next 45 
years, female LFPR in China will increase to Sweden’s 2000 level. Under this assumption, the 
annual growth rates of female LFPR for the age groups 50- 54, 55-59 and 60-64, will be 0.87, 
1.5 and 1.3 per cent, respectively. We assume that the male labour force participation will be the 
same as in the optimistic case. We define this scenario as the “very optimistic case” (VOC).
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The LFPR for both sexes of the intermediate age groups, 25 to 49, are assumed to remain at their 
2000 level.  
 
5.3   Labour supply prospects over the period 2005 to 2050 
Based on the assumed evolution of the age- and sex-specific LFPRs, the projected working age 
population and the demographic composition effects, we calculate the trends of the labour force for 
the period 2005-2050 for the three alternative scenarios. The results are shown in Tables 11 to 13. 
 
In the conventional case (Table 11) the total size of the labour force declines in all alternative 
fertility scenarios after a slight increase during the first two decades. In the baseline case, the 
labour force declines to 582 million, which is equivalent to 76 percent of the 2005 labour force. In 
the low fertility scenario (TFR declining to 1.35), the total labour force drops to slightly over 500 
million, implying that China would lose more than one quarter of her current labour force.  
 










2005   763.2  763.2  763.2  763.2 
2010 779.3  779.3  779.3  779.3 
2020 766.7  766.7  766.7  766.7 
2030 701.6  691.0  704.0  725.8 
2040 642.2  602.6  656.0  693.3 
2050 582.2  512.4  608.6  677.6 
 
If we consider only the demographic composition effect, and if China maintains her age- and sex-
specific participation rates at the 2000 level, then lifting the fertility rate to the replacement level 
(high fertility scenario) will help increase the labour supply over the next 45 years (Table 6). 
However, in the conventional case, with the assumed reduction in the LFPR of young people (aged 
19 to 24) and slight change in the elderly population (aged 50 to 64), the total size of the labour 
force will fall after 2020 as in the baseline case and in scenarios two and three. By 2050, the labour 
force will be 11 per cent smaller than in 2005 in Scenario 4 (Table 11).  
 
The evolutionary pattern of the labour force in the optimistic case is much closer to the 
conventional case (Table 12). The only difference is the slightly larger labour supply after 2020 as 
a result of the assumed increase in the LFPR for both males and females aged 50-64. For 
instance, in the low fertility scenario, by 2050 there will be 23.7 million more labourers in the  22
optimistic case compared to the conventional case. In the high fertility scenario, this figure is 24.4 
million.  
 











2005   763.2  763.2  763.2  763.2 
2010 781.7  781.7  781.7  781.7 
2020 775.4  775.4  775.4  775.4 
2030 716.5  706.0  718.9  740.0 
2040 660.8  627.1  674.5  711.5 
2050 606.0  536.1  632.5  702.0 
 
In the very optimistic case, the substantial increase in the participation rate of elderly females 
cannot completely offset the declining trend of labour supply in all fertility scenarios after 2020 
(Table 13). But the extent of the fall has been considerably reduced. For instance, in the high 
fertility scenario, the total size of the labour force in 2050 will be only five percent smaller than in 
2005.  
 











2005   763.2  763.2  763.2  763.2 
2010 783.3  783.3  783.3  783.3 
2020 782.0  782.0  782.0  782.0 
2030 728.5  718.1  730.8  751.5 
2040 677.8  638.2  691.7  728.3 
2050 628.6  558.6  655.1  725.5 
 
Comparing these three evolutionary cases, by 2050 the labour supply will be 7 per cent larger in 
the very optimistic case than in the conventional case under high fertility scenario (Figure 5). 
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Figure  5:  The  comparison  of  trend  projections  of  labour  supply  in  three               
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This simulation exercise implies that even if China’s TFR were to rise to near the replacement 
level, the total size of the labour supply will begin to contract after 2020 (Figure 5). This tends to 
reflect the decline in the LFPR of young people, irrespective of the behaviour of the LFPR of the 
elderly population. The dramatic drop in the participation rate of young people is the main driver of 
the labour supply contraction in the high fertility scenario. In contrast, the sharp decline of labour 
supply in the low, constant and medium fertility scenarios is mainly caused by the shrinking 
working age population which is, in turn, attributable to the low fertility.  
 
6   CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The present paper examines possible trends over the next 45 years of the labour supply in China. 
Alternative fertility scenarios have been constructed that take account of demographic composition 
effects and plausible changes in age-and sex-specific labour force participation. In order to focus 
on the role of demographic factors, the present analysis ignores international migration flows. The 
main findings are: 
•  First, given present levels of fertility the working age population in China will decline from 2020 
onwards (constant fertility scenario-baseline case). If fertility declines to a very low level (low 
fertility scenario), then there will be a very sharp drop in the working age population. 
Conversely, increasing the current fertility level to 1.84 (medium variant) will increase the 
working age population only slightly without preventing the declining trend beyond 2020. In 
order to achieve sustainable growth of the working age population the fertility rate would need to 
increase to the replacement level. In that case, the working age population in 2050 will slightly 
exceed its 2000 level.  24
•  Secondly, the upward shift of the age structure, i.e., population ageing, will put downward 
pressure on the labour supply in all fertility scenarios. This reflects the fact that population 
ageing reduces the aggregate labour force participation rate, even if the relevant cohort labour 
force participation rates remain at their 2000 levels. However, the demographic composition 
effect will be more severe in low fertility scenarios than with high fertility, enlarging the 
differences of labour supply in the alternative scenarios.  
•  Thirdly, the very likely reduction of the labour force participation rate of the young population 
(aged 15-24), especially of the very young aged 15-19, reduces the labour supply substantially 
from 2020 onwards in the low, constant and medium fertility scenarios. The higher fertility level 
in scenario four cannot completely offset the declining trend of the labour supply, irrespective of 
the LFPR behaviour of the elderly population. 
  
China’s economy has been and will continue to benefit from the “demographic window”
 6 that will 
be opened during next 25 years by a low share of the total dependency ratio. However, when the 
demographic window closes around 2025, the demographic profile will be quite different. As 
population ageing becomes increasingly prominent, the annual supply of new labour will start to 
decline sharply in response to the low fertility of the 1990s. China will enter a long period of 
demographic crossover: a consistent reduction in the new labour supply coupled with a consistent 
rise of the elderly population (Wang 2005). The present investigation demonstrates that the 
demographic composition effects and the probable decline in the labour force participation rate of 
the young population will accelerate the declining trend of the labour supply and make the situation 
even worse. Furthermore, any feasible increase in the labour force participation rate of the old 
provides at best only a partial offset. 
   
How can China sustain her economic growth in the light of these labour market developments?  
Without knowledge about potential changes in labour demand, it is difficult to determine whether a 
shrinking labour supply imposes a binding constraint on economic growth.  
 
In the first instance, there is evidence that supports the importance of maintaining the size of the 
labour supply. Peng (2005) has demonstrated, for a constant fertility scenario (TFR= 1.62) during 
the first half of this century, that falling labour supply will reduce the growth rate of per capita real 
GDP.
7 The Productivity Commission in Australia found complementary evidence suggesting that 
the combination of falling labour supply and population ageing in Australia would halve the current 
economic growth rate, reducing it to nearly 1.25 per cent p.a., by the mid 2020s (Productivity 
Commission 2005). Similarly, Masson and Tryon (1990) from the IMF, Turner et al. (1998) at the 
OECD, and McMorrow and Roeger (1999) from the European Commission have completed major 
studies with large macroeconomic forecasting models. Their multicountry studies of industrial  25
nations project slowing growth after 2010 as a result of population ageing, and further deceleration 
of growth after 2025.  
 
Secondly, there is no prior experience in an advanced country of falling labour supply over a long 
period of time. Advanced countries have typically experienced gradual to rapid increases in the 
labour supply during the last 30 years (McDonald and Kippen 2001). In the Asian “tiger” 
economies, such as Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Thailand the labour force has more 
than doubled during the period 1970 to 1995. China’s rapid economic growth during the last 25 
years was accompanied by a 57 percent growth in the labour force.  
 
Thirdly, it is improbable that the demand for labour will fall to match the reduction of labour supply. 
Even though increases in the price of labour could stimulate improvements to productivity, there is 
no suggestion that labour demand will fall overall to any significant extent. The counter argument is 
much more probable: rapid technological advance and the increasing availability of investment 
capital will stimulate the demand for people (McDonald and Kippen 2001, Judy and D’Amico 1997). 
Furthermore, population ageing will itself alter spending patterns and the required occupational 
structure of the labour force. Consumption demand will shift increasingly towards services and 
products that are consumed intensively by older members of the community. These outputs are 
typically labour intensive. It follows that the scope for technology to replace labour is limited 
(McDonald and Kippen 2001). 
 
Fourthly, maintenance of a stable labour force is of crucial importance for China. International 
competition for skilled and even low-skilled workers will intensify during the coming decades with 
the progress of global population ageing and resulting labour shortages, particularly in developed 
countries. Significant amounts of capital will continue to flow from the advanced economies to the 
economies that have an abundant labour supply. China’s comparative advantage lies in labour-
intensive manufacturing. Contraction of labour supply places upward pressure on wages, 
progressively eroding China’s low labour cost advantage in attracting capital. Since the ageing of 
China’s population commenced at a relatively low per capita income level, the stance of policy 
needs to be growth-oriented. Maintaining an abundant labour supply to attract foreign capital will 
help to sustain economic growth and to accommodate the increasingly elderly population.  
 
The importance of maintaining the labour supply for economic growth suggests prompt relaxation 
of the current one-child policy as a plausible and efficient policy option. A gradual increase in the 
fertility level would dampen the decline of the labour force by increasing the working age 
population and mitigating the adverse demographic composition effect on the LFPR. Though no 
policy change can prevent the occurrence of the demographic crossover, an early departure from  26
the one-child policy and a gradual increase in fertility could help to lighten the pressure of 
population ageing 20 to 30 years from now (Wang, 2005).   
 
Expansion of educational opportunities will remove large numbers of young people from the labour 
force and sharply reduce their labour force participation rate. The output consequences of this 
effect may be compensated in due course by the improvement of productivity resulting from 
increases in the stock of human capital. However, in the short to medium term it will reduce the 
labour supply.   Countervailing policy choices include increasing the obligatory retirement age and 
encouraging the elderly to remain in the labour force in order to raise the LFPR of the elderly. 
These strategies reflect the common policy approach in OECD countries. They constitute 
constructive policy options for China in ten to fifteen years when the supply of labour begins to 
decline.     27
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APPENDIX: 
 
Table A1: The possible evolution of the LFPR at ages 15-24 from 2005 to 2050 by sex (per 
cent) 
Aged 15-19  Aged 20-24 
Year 
Males  Females  Males  Females 
2005 49.3  56.4  89.8  85.9 
2010 45.5  52.4  88.4  84.8 
2015  42.0  48.7  87.1               83.8 
2020 38.7  45.2  85.8  82.7 
2025 35.7  42.0  84.5  81.7 
2030 33.0  39.0  83.2  80.7 
2035 30.4  36.3  82.0  79.7 
2040  28.1  33.7  80.7               78.7 
2045 25.9  31.3  79.5  77.7 




Table A2: The possible evolution of the LFPR at ages 50-64 from 2005 to 2050 by sex (per 
cent) – conventional case 
Aged 50-54  Aged 55-59  Aged 60-64 
Year 
Males  Females  Males  Females  Males  Females 
2005 92.5 57.8 79.8 40.3 70.2 26.8 
2010 92.2 57.4 79.3 39.7 70.8 26.7 
2015 92.0 57.3 79.0 39.5 71.0 26.7 
2020 92.0 57.3 79.0 39.4 71.0 26.7 
2025 92.0 57.3 79.0 39.4 71.0 26.7 
2030 92.0 57.3 79.0 39.4 71.0 26.7 
2035 92.0 57.3 79.0 39.4 71.0 26.7 
2040 92.0 57.3 79.0 39.4 71.0 26.7 
2045 92.0 57.3 79.0 39.4 71.0 26.7 









Table A3: The possible evolution of the LFPR at ages 50-64 from 2005 to 2050 by sex (per 
cent) – optimistic case 
Aged 50-54  Aged 55-59  Aged 60-64 
Year 
Males  Females  Males  Females  Males  Females 
2005  92.5 57.8 79.8 40.3 70.2 26.8 
2010  92.8 58.6 81.1 41.8 70.4 27.8 
2015  93.0 59.5 82.4 43.5 70.5 28.8 
2020  93.3 60.4 83.8 45.1 70.7 29.9 
2025  93.6 61.2 85.1 46.9 70.8 31.1 
2030  93.9 62.1 86.5 48.7 71.0 32.2 
2035  94.1 63.0 87.9 50.5 71.1 33.4 
2040  94.4 63.9 89.4 52.5 71.3 34.7 
2045  94.7 64.9 90.8 54.5 71.4 36.0 





Table A4: The possible evolution of the LFPR at ages 50-64 from 2005 to 2050 by sex (per 
cent) –  Very optimistic case 
Aged 50-54  Aged 55-59  Aged 60-64 
Year 
Males  Females  Males  Females  Males  Females 
2005  92.5 57.8 79.8 40.3 70.2 26.8 
2010  92.8 60.4 81.1 43.4 70.4 28.6 
2015  93.0 63.0 82.4 46.7 70.5 30.5 
2020  93.3 65.8 83.8 50.3 70.7 32.5 
2025  93.6 68.8 85.1 54.2 70.8 34.7 
2030  93.9 71.8 86.5 58.3 71.0 37.0 
2035  94.1 75.0 87.9 62.8 71.1 39.5 
2040  94.4 78.3 89.4 67.6 71.3 42.1 
2045  94.7 81.8 90.8 72.8 71.4 44.9 






                                                  
1 It should be noted that an increase in economic growth may indeed be associated with a deterioration of 
per capita income because of the acceleration of the rate of growth of the total population induced by higher 
fertility regimes. 
2 The hours worked per worker in the manufacturing sector have declined by almost ten per cent over seven 
years, from 181.7 hours per month in 1991 to 162.9 in 1998 (ILO 2006). 
3 The past thirty years have witnessed significant achievements in this area. China has achieved noticeable 
reductions in the birth rate, death rate and natural growth rate within a comparatively short period of time 
(Wang, Keng and Smyth, 2002). The crude birth rate of about 14.5 per thousand and population growth rate 
of 7.3 per thousand in 2000 are both less than half the comparable figures in the 1970s. The total fertility rate 
has dropped sharply from 4.01 in 1970 to 1.92 in 1990 and further to 1.8 in 2000, close to the average level 
of developed countries. 
4 The relatively high LFPR at the age group 15–19 in some developed countries, such as New Zealand, 
Australia, Canada and United States reflects a combination of formal education with part-time work. 
(McDonald and Kippen 2001). 
5 Documentation of the hypothesized changes in the participation rates for the alternative scenarios are 
provided in Tables A2, A3 and A4 in the Appendix. 
6 The dramatic fertility rate decline that started in the early 1970s has created rapid change in the population 
age structure in China. The child dependency ratio (the ratio of the population aged 0-14 to the working age 
population 15-64) fell from 0.7 in 1975, to 0.4 in 1995 and will continue to decline to 0.26 in 2025 (medium 
variant population projection from UN, 2004). The old dependency ratio (ratio of elderly population to the 
working age population) has been rising gradually from 0.08 in 1970 to 0.09 in 1995. From 2010 onwards, its 
rate of increase will accelerate to reach 0.20 in 2025, and almost 0.4 in 2050. The interplay between these 
two trends – the decline in child dependency ratio leading the increase in the old dependency ratio by about 
one generation - has reduced the total dependency ratio below 0.5. This “golden age structure” 
characterized by a total dependency ratio less than 0.5 will last approximately 30 years (from 1995 to around 
2025). That period is often referred to as the “demographic window” or “demographic bonus” or 
“demographic dividend” because it provides the potential for an increased pace of economic growth. At the 
later stage of the “golden age structure”, the stagnant growth in the labour supply and rapid increase in the 
old dependency ratio will dissipate the demographic dividend and close the demographic window.  
7 The projected reduction in GDP growth is two percentage points annually during the 2020s, and three 
percentage points p.a. during the 2040s. 